The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies by Kennedy, Kevin C.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2007
The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural
Subsidies
Kevin C. Kennedy
Michigan State University College of Law, kenne111@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the International Trade
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies, 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 335 (2007-2008).
THE DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
KEVIN C. KENNEDY*
For the past seven years the international trade community's attention has
been fixed on the issue of agricultural subsidies, both at the on-going Doha Round
negotiations and in recent World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
proceedings. But the issue of agricultural subsidies is not strictly speaking just a
trade issue. Reform of agricultural subsidies in developed countries embraces the
broader issue of economic development in developing countries and a
humanitarian concern for the poorest countries in the world, especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa.
I would like to discuss the specific issue of cotton subsidies. What is the
likelihood of a commodity-specific agreement on cotton and cotton subsidies as
part of the Doha Round negotiations? If the Doha Round fails, will litigation
replace negotiation as the default mechanism for reforming farm subsidies? My
short answer to the first question is that a commodity-specific agreement on cotton
is out of the question unless WTO reforms are achieved within the agricultural
sector as a whole. My short answer to the second question is that in the absence of
such WTO reforms, WTO dispute settlement proceedings could end up replacing
negotiation as the mechanism for reforming government subsidies to the farm
sector.
Let me begin by briefly reviewing the critical role that agriculture, in
particular cotton production, plays in the economies of a large group of least-
developed countries located in sub-Saharan Africa. Thirty-four of the world's fifty
poorest countries, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are located in sub-
Saharan Africa.' Farming plays a leading role in the work force and the overall
economies of LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with the balance primarily in the
extractive industries of mining and oil.2 With the exceptions of Cape Verde and
Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum more than 50 percent of the total labor
. Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Professor Kennedy can be contacted at
kennel 1 @law.msu.edu.
1. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
LIST OF LDCs, LLDCs AND SIDS BY REGIONS, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/allcountries-
regions.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
2. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOCSOC], Overcoming Poverty Through Productive
Employment and Decent Work for Income Generation in Least Developed Countries, 2, (July 3, 2007),
http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LDC%20Documents/ECOSOC2007/ECOSOC%202007-
ILO%20paper.pdf.
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force in all SSA LDCs. 3 One of the most important crops grown in sub-Saharan
Africa is cotton.4 As a percentage of total world merchandise trade, raw cotton's
share is miniscule (approximately one-tenth of one percent). Nevertheless, cotton
is one of the most important textile fibers in the world, accounting for over 40
percent of total world fiber production. 6 While some eighty countries produce
cotton, cotton production is concentrated in a handful of countries (see Table 1).
Table 1. World Cotton Production, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country 2001/02 2002/03 003/04 2004/05 005/06 2006/07(forecast)
China 5,313 4,921 ,855 6,314 5,704 5,987
United 4,421 3,747 ,975 5,062 5,201 4,507
States I_ II
India 2,678 2,308 3,048 4,137 ,137 k,355
Pakistan 1,807 1,698 1,687 2,426 2,145 2,286
Brazil 766 847 1,310 1,285 1,023 1,197
Uzbekistan 1,067 1,002 893 1,132 1,241 1,110
Turkey 865 1910 1893 904 773 904
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service
7
The world's four largest producing and consuming countries are China, the
United States, India, and Pakistan, with the United States, China, and India
together providing over half the world's cotton. As Table 2 illustrates, the world's
largest importer is China, consuming 40 percent of the world's total production.
3. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 2004, The Least Developed Countries Report
2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction, 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004
(2004).
4. See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali, Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton, 2-3, TN/AG/GEN/4
(May 16, 2003), available at
http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/CottonSubmissionWTO.pdf.
5. See John Baffes, Cotton: Market Setting. Trade Policies, and Issues v (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3218 2004), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/03/000009486-20040603091724/R
endered/PDF/wps3218cotton.pdf.
6. See id. at 29.
7. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE,
CIRCULAR SERIES, 7 tbl. 1 (June 2006), http://www. fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2006/07/table0l.pdf.
VOL. 36:3/4
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Table 2. World Cotton Imports, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
(forecast)
China 98 681 1,923 1,390 4,137 4,355
Turkey 648 493 516 742 751 555
Indonesia 513 485 468 479 479 479
Pakistan 218 185 403 730 370 370
Bangladesh 261 348 370 403 446 468
Thailand 410 423 365 497 435 468
Russia 392 359 321 316 327 327
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service
8
The world's largest exporter of cotton is the United States, which ranks
second to China in cotton production, accounting for 40 percent of global trade in
raw cotton (see Table 3). In fact, 70 percent of cotton grown in the United States is
for export.
Table 3. World Cotton Exports, 2001/02-2006/07 Marketing Years
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
-forecast)
United 2,395 2,591 2,995 3,137 3,658 3,658
States
Uzbekistan 762 740 675 860 1,045 991
Australia 681 578 470 436 675 610
Greece 218 250 267 255 294 316
Brazil 147 106 210 339 446 327
Burkina 142 158 207 212 294 305
Faso
India 13 12 152 144 544 827
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service 9
Table 4 lists the ten largest producers of cotton in sub-Saharan Africa for
2003/04-2006/07. In the West and Central African (WCA) countries of Benin,
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo (the Cotton Four), cotton production accounts
8. Id.
9. Id.
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for up to 10 percent of gross domestic product. I° Over 90 percent of the cotton
produced in the WCA countries is for export."i Exports from these WCA countries
are dominated by cotton, which represents approximately 30 percent of total export
earnings and over 60 percent of earnings from agricultural exports. 12
Table 4. Cotton Production in Sub-Saharan Africa,
2003/04-2006/07 Marketing Years (Top 10 Producers)
(Season Beginning August 1) (1,000 Metric Tons)
Country 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
(Forecast)
Burkina 210 200 218 294
Faso
Mali 1261 233 218 239
Zimbabwe 100 114 76 114
Benin 149 147 131 109
Cameroon 109 109 94 109
C6te 87 105 124 109
d'Ivoire
Sudan 76 87 93 87
Togo 71 72 69 50
Tanzania 51 71 103 65
Source: U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service ' 3
Collectively, the WCA countries are the seventh largest global producer of
cotton after China, the United States, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and Uzbekistan. With
approximately a 15-percent share of global exports, the WCA countries
collectively are the second largest exporter after the United States. 14 Although
cotton plays only a minor role in the economic activities of industrialized
countries, it is of vital importance in many WCA countries. Over 10 million
people in the region - where people earn less than a dollar a day - depend directly
on cotton production, making it possible to improve the physical and social
infrastructure in cotton-producing regions, including roads, schools, and health
centers. 15 Cotton occupies a strategic position in the development policies and
poverty reduction programs of the WCA countries. Cotton accounts for 5-10
10. World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 1.
11. Id. at 4
12. Id. at 1.
13. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE
CIRCULAR SERIES FC 07-04, 13-17 tbls. 5a & 6a (July 2004), available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2004/07/CottonWMT.pdf; FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T
AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE, CIRCULAR SERIES FC 06-06, 13-18 tbls. 5a & 6a
(June 2006), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2006/06/CottonWMT.pdf.
14. World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 2.
15. Idat 1-4.
VOL. 36:3/4
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percent of GDP in Burkina Faso and Benin, but less than 0.1 percent in the United
States. 16
With at least a dozen countries around the world subsidizing their cotton
producers, including China and the United States which subsidize their cotton
growers up to 20 percent and 50 percent of world prices, respectively, world prices
for cotton have been suppressed due to overproduction. 17 In an attempt to correct
this situation, a joint proposal was submitted by the four West and Central African
nations of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali at the 2003 WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancin, Mdxico, requesting that all subsidies on cotton be
eliminated immediately. 18 Their proposal, commonly known as the Cotton
Initiative, contends that WCA countries have undertaken internal market reforms
in order to make their respective cotton sectors more competitive globally, but that
these reforms have been virtually nullified by the subsidies given by other WTO
members to cotton farmers.19 The Cotton Initiative proponents argue that if these
domestic and export subsidies were eliminated, "cotton production in WCA
countries would be highly profitable and could act as an important catalyst for
poverty reduction in the countries concerned.
' 20
The joint proponents of the Cotton Initiative (popularly known as the "Cotton
Four") have called for a "'complete phase-out of support measures for the
production and export of cotton.",2 1 Countries that subsidize their cotton growers
were expected to agree to a total elimination of domestic and export subsidies
"immediately" and independent of any other commitments from other WTO
members on other agricultural issues. 2 Until such time as cotton subsidies are
completely eliminated, the Cotton Initiative requests that cotton growers in LDCs
receive compensation offsetting income lost as a result of such subsidies.23
In July 2004, a group of ninety developing countries championed the Cotton
Four's cause by insisting that cotton subsidies be dealt with as a stand-alone issue
and outside the agriculture negotiations.24 The G90's position was met with stiff
resistance from former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who was
adamant that the issue of cotton subsidies be negotiated within the broader context
16. CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, THE AFRICAN COTTON INITIATIVE AND WTO AGRICULTURE
NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2004), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/04Jan/RS21712.pdf.
17. See World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 4; see INT'L COTTON ADVISORY COMM.,
PRODUCTION AND TRADE POLICIES AFFECTING THE COTTON INDUSTRY 1-3 (Sept. 2006), available at
http://www.icac.org/govt-measures/documents/govt measures06.pdf.
18. See World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at 2.
19. See id. at 3.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 2.
22. See id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
24. World Trade Organization, ACP Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Work Programme,
Communication from Trinidad and Tobago, WT/L/578, at 6, (July 26, 2004) ("Cotton continues to be a
vital issue for ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] States and requires an urgent solution. In this
regard, the ACP States underscore that it should be treated as a stand-alone issue and not as a part of the
overall negotiations on agriculture.").
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of the agriculture negotiations. 25 The European Union and the WTO Director-
General supported Zoellick's position.2 6 In the end, perhaps knowing that Brazil
would keep pressure on the United States on the issue of cotton subsidies, the G90
and the Cotton Four backed off from their demand that cotton be dealt with as a
stand-alone item.27
Following weeks of intense negotiations, preceded by months of stalemate,
the WTO General Council reached an eleventh-hour framework agreement on
agricultural negotiations in late July 2004 that included a compromise reached
between the United States and the Cotton Four. 8 The cotton provision of the WTO
General Council's August 2004 Doha work program provides that (1) cotton will
be addressed "ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically" as part of the Doha
Round agriculture negotiations; (2) a subcommittee on cotton will be created that
will meet periodically with the WTO Committee on Agriculture ensuring
"appropriate prioritization of the cotton issue independently from other sectoral
initiatives;" and (3) the WTO Director General is to work with international
organizations to direct additional resources towards development of economies
where cotton has vital importance.29
The Cotton Initiative languished thereafter for more than a year. At the
December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference language was included in the
Ministerial Declaration that reiterates that reform of trade-distorting cotton
subsidies is to go farther and faster than reforms on subsidies for other agricultural
commodities. 30 The Ministerial Declaration provides that:
o All forms of export subsidies for cotton be eliminated by developed
countries in 2006.
o On market access, developed countries give duty and quota free access for
cotton exports from least-developed countries (LDCs) from the
commencement of the implementation period.
o Trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production be reduced more
ambitiously than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it
25. Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the G-90 Trade
Ministers Meeting (July 12, 2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2004/July/Section-Index.html.
26. Danuta Huibner, E.U. Comm'r, Address at the G-90 Ministerial Meeting Plenary Opening
Session, 2 (July 12, 2004), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc1 18016.pdf, Supachai
Panitchpakdi, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Statement Distributed to G-90 Ministers (July 12, 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news04 e/stat dgmauritiusjuly04_e.htm.
27. Trade Observatory, Africa Softens Stand on Cotton Subsidies (July 26, 2004),
http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.cfm?reflD=3685 1.
28. See Elizabeth Becker, Geneva Talks Move Towards Farm Pact, N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, §
W.
29. World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council 1 August 2004,
WT/L/579 at I 1(b), Annex A at 4, (Aug. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda e/draft-textgc dg_3 july04_e.htm.
30. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC, at 3, 11 (Dec. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min05_e/final-text-e.htm.
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should be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally
applicable.... 31
In connection with the third point, in an attempt to make concrete the phrase "more
ambitiously," the Cotton Four proposed a formula in March 2006 that called for
deeper subsidies cuts for cotton if reductions for other commodities are modest,
and a timetable for making such reductions that are one-third the time for
agriculture as a whole.32 Their proposal received a warm reception from China and
the EU, but the United States was more reserved in its response.33 In July 2007 the
chairman of the WTO committee responsible for agriculture negotiations,
Crawford Falconer, issued a draft paper that contained the following provisions on
cotton subsidies:
* Cut amber box support for cotton - the most trade-distorting of all
domestic subsidies -- by 82.2%.
* Cut blue box support for cotton to a level that is one-third that for other
crops (blue box subsidies are production-limiting subsidies).
• Reduce trade-distorting domestic support on cotton over a period that is
one third of the implementation period for other crops.
* Eliminate export subsidies on cotton by the start of the implementation
period (as opposed to 2013 for export subsidies on other agricultural
commodities that are provided by developed countries).34
Whether the WCA cotton producers actually will receive special
consideration in the Doha Round agriculture negotiations remains doubtful.
Predictably, the U.S.-based National Cotton Council and some members of
Congress are opposed to any special agreement in the WTO that singles out cotton
and cotton subsidies.
What impact have agricultural subsidies had on cotton growers in sub-
Saharan Africa? That question was indirectly answered in the 2004 WTO dispute
settlement proceeding brought by Brazil against the United States. Brazil was
ultimately successful in proving that U.S. domestic subsidies to cotton producers
have a price suppressing effect on world prices for cotton, thus causing serious
prejudice to Brazil in world cotton markets.35 In a similar vein, SSA cotton
31. Id.
32. See Sub-Committee on Cotton, Communication from the Co-Sponsors of the Sectoral
Initiative in Favor of Cotton, TN/AG/SCC/GEN/4, at 2, 4 (Mar. 1, 2006); see also Press Release, WTO
Cotton Sub-Committee, Members Mull New Details in "Cotton Four" Proposal (Mar. 2, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06 e/cotton 2march06_e.htm.
33. See Press Release, WTO Cotton Sub-Committee, Members Mull New Details in "Cotton
Four" Proposal (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news06 e/cotton 2march06 e.htm.
34. See WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for
Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4, at 9, 24 (Aug. 1, 2007).
35. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 763,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Upland Cotton]. In its 2008 report on the whether the
United States had complied with the Appellate Body's 2005 report, the Appellate Body once again
confirmed that U.S. cotton subsidies violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008).
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growers maintain that they have to contend with artificially low prices for cotton
on world markets as a result of being forced to compete with subsidized cotton in
those markets.36 Let me briefly summarize the argument that subsidies suppress
the price of cotton in third-country and world markets.
At least a dozen countries provide direct support to cotton production: the
United States, China, India, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Uzbekistan,
Colombia, Benin, and Egypt. 37 Subsidies that are tied to the price of a commodity
encourage production, which in turn encourage overproduction even when market
forces are signaling that production should be decreased. By encouraging
overproduction, these subsidies prevent the price of cotton on world markets from
naturally rising as they would in a market of steady demand and declining supplies.
In a report published in April 2007, the Congressional Research Service estimated
that subsidies to U.S. cotton growers over the ten-year period 1996-2005 averaged
$2.47 billion annually.38 In 2003/04 the amount of support was over $5 billion.39
The adjusted world price for cotton in 2004 was nearly $.56 per pound, the highest
it has been in seven seasons. 40 In 2006/07, the average international price for
cotton rose to $.60 per pound.41 But these prices are still down from their 1994-
1995 high of over $.76 per pound.42
Although the United States Trade Representative's office and U.S. cotton
farmers contend that the most important determinant of world cotton prices is
Chinese production and Chinese import levels, various studies conclude that world
cotton prices are also affected by U.S. subsidies.43 An agriculture economist with
36. See Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Brazil: WTO Cotton Victory Against U.S.
Reaffirmed, BRIDGES: WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-03-09/storyl .htm; see also World Trade Organization, supra note 4, at
2.
37. See INT'L COTTON ADVISORY COMM., supra note 17, at 1-3; see also JOHN BAFFES ET. AL.,
COTTON: MARKET STRUCTURE, POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 2-3, 6, 7 (2004),
http://www.worldbank.org/prospects (follow "Resources: Cotton" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 19,
2008).
38. RANDY SCHNEPF & JASPER WOMACH, POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. FARM SUBSIDIES IN
THE WTO 24 (2007), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33697.pdf
39. Id. at 28.
40. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., COTTON: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE,
CIRCULAR SERIES FOP 08-02, 24 tbl. 8 (Feb. 2008), available at:
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2008/February/cotton0208.pdf, see also Kevin C. Kennedy,
The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the
Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 315
(2005).
41. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., supra note 40, at 24 tbl. 8. See also Karen Halverson Cross, King
Cotton, Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': The WTO's U.S. Cotton Subsidies Decision, 9 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 149, 183 n. 206 (2006) (explaining the WTO Appellate Body's decision to uphold the
finding that the Cotlook Index-A reflected the world market price for cotton).
42. See FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., supra note 40, at 24 tbl. 8.
43. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SUPPORT TO COTTON
FARMERS 3-4 (2004),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2004/asset-upload-file784-6153.pdf ; see
also Ron Smith, The China Syndrome Dictates U.S. Cotton Prices, Sw. FARM PRESS, Nov. 19, 2004,
VOL. 36:3/4
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the University of California concludes that the elimination of U.S. cotton subsidies
would increase world prices by about 10 percent. 44 Other studies have shown an
impact as high as 30 percent, while others, including one by the International
Monetary Fund, find an impact of 2-3 percent. 45 A number of factors affect these
findings, including the base year used for counting U.S. payments, which are often
linked to prices and rise when prices fall, and to production in other countries.
While findings range from a 30-percent impact to a 2-percent impact, the real
impact is probably somewhere in between.
Putting to one side the question of what impact subsidies have on the world
price of cotton, from the standpoint of comparative advantage, should either sub-
Saharan Africa or the United States be growing cotton? By international
standards, the WCA countries produce high-quality cotton with production costs
among the lowest in the world, clearly lower than those of the United States and
the European Union. According to a 2002 World Bank working paper, cotton is
"an economically viable crop" in West and Central Africa "that has had a
significant and positive impact on exports, economic growth, and rural
development., 46 The region produces high-quality cotton and high average crop
yields by international standards, and does so using farming techniques that are
labor intensive (in contrast to mechanized cotton farming in the United States) and
on small, one-to-three acre farms.47 U.S. cotton growers, on the other hand, are not
low-cost producers of cotton. On the contrary, statistics from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture estimate that the average cost of producing a pound of raw cotton in
the United States is $.73 per pound, compared to an average cost of production in
Burkina Faso of $.21 per pound. 48  According to the Congressional Research
Service, 37 percent of U.S. cotton growers' total costs are covered by subsidies.
49
In other words, U.S. cotton farmers' revenue covers only 63 percent of their total
costs. As noted by the Congressional Research Service, "These comparisons
http://southwestfarnpress.com/news/041119-china-cotton-prices/
44. Daniel A. Sumner, A Quantitative Simulation Analysis of the Impacts of U.S. Cotton
Subsidies on Cotton Prices and Quantities, 1 (reproduced in Brazil's Further Submission of Sept. 9,
2003, Annex 1), available at
http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/ministerio/sitios-secretaria/cgc/analisequantitativa.pdf.
45. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Afr., Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa's Trade
Potential at 34, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.K.12 (2004), available at
http://www.uneca.org/era2004/chapl.pdf; Stephen Tokarick, Trade Issues in the Doha Round:
Dispelling Some Misconceptions, IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/06/4, at 15 (2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/pdp/2006/pdp04.pdf.
46. Ousmane Badiane, Dhaneshwar Ghura, Louis Goreux, & Paul Masson, Cotton Sector
Strategies in West ond Central Africa 9 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2867, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=636229.
47. Id.; see also Gdrald Estur, Int'l Cotton Advisory Comm., Speech Presented to the Beltwide
Cotton Economics and Marketing Conference: Is West African Cotton Competitive with the U.S. on the
World Cotton Market?, at 1-2, 4 (Jan. 7, 2005),
http://www.icac.org/cotton-info/speeches/estur/2005/beltwide 05.pdf.
48. KEVIN WATKINS, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF US COTTON SUBSIDIES ON AFRICA
1 l(Oxfam Briefing Paper 30, 2002), available at http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/ag/resources/Oxfaml.pdf
49. SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supra note 38, at 26.
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suggest that it is only with the aid of subsidies that a substantial portion of U.S.
[cotton] production is made economically sustainable. 5 °
Sub-Saharan Africa faces many complex problems, and complex problems
generally call for complex solutions. However, in the case of cotton, the answer to
the question of how to help the region's cotton producers seems to call for an
economically simple solution, but unfortunately one that is politically difficult:
eliminate government subsidies to cotton producers and create an interim
mechanism to compensate SSA cotton producers for lost income until all
government subsidies to cotton producers are phased out. A recent World Bank
working paper supports the view that subsidies reform in developed countries
would be beneficial to West African cotton producers.5'
What are the prospects for subsidies reform by the world's major cotton
producers? The U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Agriculture Secretary stated in
2005 that if a Doha Round agreement on agriculture is not concluded, then it
would be very difficult to address the African demands on cotton.52 The complete
elimination of both domestic and export subsidies seems unlikely, although WTO
members have pledged to eliminate export subsidies on all agricultural products by
"by a credible end date," which is probably 2013. 53 Because export subsidies are
deemed to be per se trade distorting, they have been prohibited on all non-
agricultural trade since 1995.54 Extending this prohibition to agricultural trade has
been agreed to in principle; the next step is to agree on a phase-out period.
With regard to the thornier issue of domestic subsidies, perhaps the best near-
term solution for WCA cotton producers is for subsidizing nations to move to a
system of fully decoupled support (that is, support that is not tied to production in
any respect) rather than price support.55 In order for decoupled support to work in
a less market distorting way than it currently does, such support must have the
following features.
First, to ensure that production is not encouraged, decoupled support has to be
the only form of farm support. The 2008 farm bill that was enacted over President
Bush's veto moves in that direction, but only slightly.56 Likewise, the condition
that land stay in agriculture as a condition for receipt of decoupled support should
be eliminated because it only serves to encourage production. The amber box and
blue box categories of farm support that are tied either to price or production, as
50. Id. at 25.
51. See Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade Organization's Doha Cotton
Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues 7, 17-18 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3918, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=917489.
52. See Bruce Odessey, U.S. Waits for Substantial Agriculture Offers from Others at WTO, U.S.
DEP'T OF ST., Oct. 11, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2005/Oct/l 1-41521 1.html.
53. World Trade Organization, supra note 29, at 17.
54. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 3.1-3.2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter SCM].
55. See Baffes, supra note 5, at 32.
56. See Food, Energy, and Conservation Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).
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well as exempted de minimis subsidies of up to 5 percent of a country's total
agricultural production, must be eliminated. Second, just as import quotas on
textile and clothing were gradually phased out over a ten-year period under the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, so too all export subsidies and domestic
subsidies in the form of decoupled support should be progressively phased out.
57
Turning to internal reforms within sub-Saharan Africa, room exists for greater
market reforms within WCA cotton-producing countries.58 In addition, only 10
percent of African trade is with other African nations, leaving a fragmented market
that cannot achieve economies of scale, making the region less attractive as a
destination for foreign investment. 59 Underscoring this point, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) observes that "the full
potential of intra-African trade has yet to be fully exploited through greater
coordination of efforts aimed at harmonizing customs procedures and reducing
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and at improving transport and communications links
through greater investment in developing regional infrastructure." 60 For this
reason, it has been suggested that the key to sub-Saharan Africa becoming a
significant player in the global economy is for SSA countries to form a regional
trading bloc. 61 However, the record of existing SSA free trade areas and customs
unions in integrating the economies of their member states is at best mixed. Based
on the region's choppy experience with free trade areas and customs unions, I find
the suggestion to create a pan-SSA trading bloc, whether in the form of a free trade
area or a customs union, to be extremely problematic.
UNCTAD has also suggested that phasing out agricultural support should
coincide with increased international financial and technical assistance to
agriculture in the LDCs to promote agricultural productivity growth and
commercialization.6 2 In 2001 government payments to farmers in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries were actually seven
times the level of total official development assistance (ODA) to the LDCs. 63 In
2001, net flows of ODA to LDCs would have doubled if just 14 percent of the
2001 value of government payments to OECD agricultural producers had been
redirected in aid to the LDCs. 64 There is thus an opportunity for major poverty
57. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (terminated Jan. 1, 2005).
58. See Ben Shepherd & Claire Delpeuch, Subsidies and Regulatory Reform in West African
Cotton: What Are the Development Stakes? (Groupe d'Economie Mondiale, MPRA Paper No. 2289,
2007), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-meunchen.de/2289/.
59. See Gumisai Mutume, How to Boost Trade within Africa: Lower Barriers and Diversify
Production, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 20 (2002).
60. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2003, Economic Development in Africa:
Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence 54, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2003/1
(2003).
61. See id. at 53-54.
62. See id. at 55-60.
63. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, The Least Developed Countries Report
2004: Improving the Trade-Poverty Relationship through the International Trade Regime, 229, U.N.
Doc UNCTAD/LDC/2004 (2004).
64. Id.
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reduction benefits not only through phasing out agricultural support but also by
increasing international assistance to promote agricultural development in the
LDCs. With regard to UNCTAD's suggestion of providing aid to SSA cotton
producers during the transition period, it is time for the European Union and the
United States to agree to a coordinated, collaborative trade and development
program for sub-Saharan Africa. As the region's first and second largest trading
partners, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all trade with the region, the
European Union and the United States are perfectly placed to influence the
economic course of sub-Saharan Africa through a coordinated trade, aid, and
development program for the region. It is time to join forces for the good of the
world's poorest nations.
Considering the heavy dependency of sub-Saharan Africa on agriculture, U.S.
agricultural policy appears to be unintentionally punishing SSA cotton growers and
working at cross purposes with the U.S. trade preference and development
program for the region, the African Growth and Opportunity Act. SSA cotton
producers, who are internationally competitive, are hobbled when it comes to fully
competing in international markets largely due to a single, but formidable,
exogenous factor: a subsidies-distorted international market for cotton. Elimination
of cotton subsidies in China, the European Union, and the United States -
especially in China and the United States, the world's two largest producers, and,
in the case of the United States, the world's top exporter with a 40-percent share of
total world exports - would lead to a reallocation of production to lower cost
producers, including those in West and Central Africa. The latter in turn would
experience increased income and a reduction in poverty in what is the poorest
region of the world. At the same time, however, internal reforms within the SSA
cotton sector need to be vigorously pursued, including reform of inefficient
monopsonies within the region and greater vertical integration of cotton
production. In addition, if the region is to be weaned from its overdependence on
agriculture, then sending signals in the form of increased prices to current cotton
farmers to stay in cotton production, and to potential cotton farmers to grow
cotton, has to be anticipated and planned for.
With the Doha Round negotiations on reducing agricultural subsidies and
improving market access deadlocked, which in turn has led to stalemate in the
overall negotiations, the hurdle of eliminating cotton subsidies is clearly
insurmountable in the absence of forward movement on agriculture negotiations as
a whole. The 2002 U.S. Farm Act has been replaced with the 2008 Farm Bill that
essentially maintains the status quo. The same subsidy programs for U.S. farmers
that were part of the 2002 Farm Bill are continued at approximately the same rates
65
of payment. Even ifthe Doha Round negotiations can be revived soon, it might
be impossible to achieve meaningful reform of agricultural subsidies.
In the meantime, as Brazil has successfully defended its 2005 victory at the
WTO in the 2008 Appellate Body report in the Upland Cotton case,66 African
65. See Food, Energy, and Conservation Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (2008).
66. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008). See also RANDY SCHNEPF, BRAZIL'S
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countries are themselves threatening to bring a WTO complaint unless meaningful
progress is achieved soon on the Cotton Initiative. 67 With the expiration of the
"peace clause" in the Agreement on Agriculture in 2003, 68 other U.S. crops
besides cotton might also be vulnerable to litigation, not only at the WTO, but also
from domestic producers in countries that import U.S. agricultural commodities
who could file countervailing duty petitions with their national investigating
authorities. Earlier this year, Canada filed a WTO complaint against the United
States challenging U.S. subsidies to corn producers. 69 I don't want to leave you
with the false impression that the United States is a subsidies sinner in a world of
free-market saints. On the contrary, the world's largest subsidizer is the EU,
followed by the United States, with Japan a distant third.70 However, when stated
as a percentage of total agricultural production, all three provide subsidies that
amount to roughly 37 percent of the total value of their respective agricultural
production. 71 Having said that, as Table 5 shows, U.S. subsidies on corn, soybeans,
sorghum, and wheat are huge.
Table 5. U.S. Commodity-Specific Program Support and Insurance, Subsidy
Payments, Yearly Average, FY1996-2005
Av. Subsidy Payments Subsidy Paymnxt Cash Receipts
Subsidy
Crop Period Period Total Share of
Commodity CCC' Ins_4 Total Mm Max Value Total Value
$ Millions
Rice 981 9 990 450 1,786 1.379 72%
Upland Cotton 2.221 247 2,458 736 6,522 4229 58%
Sorghum 376 63 439 188 991 984 451%
'Wheat 2,024 288 2,312 1 374 5,418 6,798 34%
Ba.ley 171 18 190 86 414 636 30%
Corn 4,390 88 4-478 1.120 10,149 18.024 25%
Oats 19 4 23 9 64 93 25.
Sunflower Seed 47 29 76 0 178 368 21%
Canola 18 10 27 0 60 137 20-i
Flaxseec 5 1 6 0 21 49 1391.
Dry Peas 5 1 6 0 36 49 12%
Peanuts 73 31 104 0 332 909 11%
Soybeans 1,362 120 1,481 0 3,520 14,772 IM.
Source: Congressional Research Service 72
WTO CASE AGAINST THE U.S. COTTON PROGRAM 18-20 (2007), available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07OctRL32571 .pdf.
67. See id. at 20-22.
68. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 1(f), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
69. Request for Consultations by Canada, United States-Subsidies and Other Domestic Support
for Corn and Other Agricultural Products, WT/DS357/1 (Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Subsidies and
Other Domestic Support].
70. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES THAT
DISTORT WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE: PREVALENCE AND MAGNITUDE ix (2005), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6614/08-22-Doha.pdf.
71. Id. at xi.
72. SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supra note 37, at 23.
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These commodities also receive domestic subsidies under the same statutory
programs that the WTO Appellate Body found to be WTO-inconsistent in Upland
Cotton.73 And as shown in Table 6, the United States has substantial world market
shares of corn, soybeans, sorghum, and wheat.
Table 6. U.S. Share of World Production and Trade for Selected Commodities, Yearly
Average, 2002-2005
Farm Farm US. Exports: U.S. Share of
Cash Value Shaze of U.S. World World
Commodity Receipts of Exports Production Production Exports
$ Million Percent Percent
Corn 19,587 3.468 18% 40% 61%
Soybeans 16,631 5,791 35% 38"/ 44%
Wheat 6,807 3,398 50% 9% 25%
Cotton 5,204 3,644 70% 200/o 40%
Rice 1,216 638 52% 2% 13%
Sorghum 869 412 47% 18% 83%
Peanuts 761 92 12% 6% 11%
Source: Congressional Research Service
74
Query whether those world market shares have been at the expense of
producers in other WTO member countries? Brazil demonstrated in Upland Cotton
that establishing a WTO violation is not an insurmountable obstacle in a WTO
dispute settlement proceeding. 75 Canada will press similar arguments in its recent
WTO complaint brought against U.S. subsidies to corn growers. 76 In short, U.S.
subsidies programs for agricultural commodities are vulnerable to legal challenge
at the WTO and possibly in countervailing duties actions brought by domestic
producers in other WTO member countries. With the collapse of the Doha Round
looming, litigation may unfortunately replace negotiation as the default mechanism
for forcing reforms.
73. See id. at 9-32; see Upland Cotton, supra note 35.
74. See SCHNEPF & WOMACH, supra note 38, at 31.
75. Upland Cotton, supra note 35.
76. See U.S. Subsidies and Other Domestic Support, supra note 69.
VOL. 36:3/4
HeinOnline -- 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 348 2007-2008
